{"success":true,"data":{"id":"cross-context-login-session-phish","label":"Cross-context login session phish — \"companion / connector / verifier\" app asks you to sign in at your real IdP then forwards your session to the attacker (2026 post-passkey pivot)","description":"As passkeys replace passwords, phishing pivots from credential harvest to SESSION-TOKEN harvest. In this attack class, a \"companion\", \"helper\", \"connector\", or \"verifier\" app on an attacker-controlled origin asks the user to sign in at their real IdP (Microsoft 365 / Google Workspace / Okta / OneLogin / PingOne / Auth0 / Azure AD / Entra) in a separate popup window. The attacker page then uses postMessage, window.name, or same-origin iframe techniques to pick up the authenticated session token and forward it to the attacker's server. Because the user IS at their real IdP when signing in, MFA and passkey checks pass — the attacker harvests a valid post-auth session. Distinct from aitm-session-cookie-phishing-lure which proxies the entire login flow via Evilginx / Muraena. Fires when the body contains ALL of (1) helper/companion/connector/verifier product language, (2) sign-in-at-real-IdP step, (3) session-transfer / session-link / session-forward language. Excludes known IdP senders and SaaS vendors, reply threads, and newsletter articles about the technique.","tier":"danger","category":"phishing","isThin":false}}